Financial transmission right (FTR) is a financial tool to hedge the congestion component of the locational marginal price (LMP) across two different nodes in a transmission system. FTR is usually purchased by a firm transmission customer and is a financial equivalent of the physical power delivered across the two nodes. In the case of wind farms, the generator might not produce energy when the price difference due to congestion exists. This concept of FTR which is primarily designed for conventional generation and loads might expose the wind farms to a negative cash flow which is a potential issue with the intermittent generations such as wind [1] . In this paper, the drawbacks of the existing FTRs and factors influencing the FTR investment for a wind project are analyzed. Finally, the paper discusses the concept of wind FTRs which provides a potential solution to overcome the drawbacks of existing FTRs and thereby reduce the risk of negative cash flow for wind projects.
Introduction
The major organisations formed to ensure reliability and market regulation of the bulk power system in USA are Federal energy regulatory commission (FERC), North American Electric reliability corporation (NERC) and the Regional transmission organisations (RTOs). FERC is an independent agency formed to provide national energy infrastructure and regulate electricity markets along with several other responsibilities. NERC is formed to ensure reliable operation of the bulk power system in North America by framing appropriate standards for the electric grid. RTOs are independent agencies formed across several regions to accommodate FERC policies and maintain reliable operation of the grid at lowest electricity prices possible [2] . The three major roles played by a RTO in a wind project are during generation interconnection request, transmission service request and market settlements for holding transmission rights. The three roles are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.
In order to interconnect a generation source to a transmission system, the generator owner (wind farm developer in this case) has to undergo a procedure conducted by the RTOs named as generation interconnection study (GIS) process. The process consists of series of studies to ensure the reliability of the transmission system after the interconnection of the new generation plant. The generation interconnection studies (GIS) would identify the upgrades required to reliably interconnect the plant to the transmission network. The key feature for the interconnection customers in the GIS process is to file the request in interconnection queue [3] . The transmission provider would prioritize the customers on a first come first served basis.
The study would include all the generation requests in the queue filed prior to the one under study [3] . The interconnection customers can choose to withdraw their request during any phase of the process but are obliged to pay the costs incurred until then [3] .
In order to deliver power from the generation node to the load center, the customers are required to go through a separate study known as transmission service requests (TSR). The transmission service requests are classified into point to point (PTP) transmission service or network integrated transmission service (NITS). PTP transmission service and NITS are further classified into firm and nonfirm requests discussed in the sub-sections below.
Generator owners have an option of choosing either PTP or NITS. PTP transmission service is chosen when the generator owner requests transmission injecting energy at a certain point and delivers at another point. NITS is chosen when the energy is supplied to several loads in a certain area instead of having multiple PTP requests [4] . NITS allows supply of electricity to network loads using their network resources along with ancillary services [5] . NITS are often used by utilities which needs to supply electricity to rural areas, electric co-operatives and municipal utilities [4] .
Since NITS requires mandatory supply of power at all times, it is less often used for wind projects. Hence PTP service is discussed in more detail in the following paragraph.
PTP requests are further classified into firm or nonfirm transmission service. Firm transmission service is less likely to be curtailed during a transmission congestion compared to non-firm requests [5] . Firm transmission customers would reserve financial transmission rights (FTRs). Firm PTP requests have a maximum term of up to several years depending on the available transfer capacity and a minimum term of one day [5] . Firm PTP requests requested for a term of one year or more fall under long term requests and those requested for less than one year are short term requests.
The transmission capacity available in excess to that needed to accommodate native load customers, network customers; long and short term firm transmission services can be reserved for non-firm PTP transmission service [5] . The non firm PTP transmission service is available for a maximum term of one month and a minimum period of one hour.
FTRs are discussed in more detail along with an example in section 2. T h e risks involved in the application of currently available FTRs to wind projects are explained in section 3. The concept of wind FTRs to overcome the risks involved is discussed in section 4. Finally, the paper concludes by providing recommendations for the implementation of wind FTRs and the future work that has to be done by the wind and utility industry to overcome the FTR issues that are currently faced in the market.
Financial Transmission ights R
The network customers with firm transmission service are exposed to the risk of pricing difference (difference in LMPs) due to congestion while transferring energy from one bus to another in the grid. In order to avoid the pricing uncertainty due to transmission constraints, transmission rights were awarded to the network customers. The preliminary form of transmission rights was when the network customer acquired rights to physically deliver a certain amount of energy along a specific path between the two interconnection nodes. These rights were named as physical transmission rights (PTR). PTRs worked well for a simple grid structure with radially connected generators and loads and a minimally developed market mechanism [9] . As the grids got extremely complex with time and power flow between two points in various loops, it was not possible to define a specific path between two points to obtain PTRs. Furthermore, the holder of the PTR can use the transmission line to transfer energy across the line, sell it to another customer or leave it unused. Blocking the physical capacity of transmission line leads to congestion and unnecessary increase in grid capacity [9] . The load entities might be prevented from importing cheap power from external regions by with-holding the physical capacity of the tie lines connecting the region's leading to a highly in-efficient market mechanism. Hence, financial transmission rights are introduced to overcome the issues mentioned above. FTRs are currently implemented in NYISO, ISO-NE, PJM, MISO, CAISO and ERCOT. SPP will transition from energy imbalance market to integrated marketplace which includes FTRs starting March 2014.
Financial transmission right is a financial tool to hedge the congestion component of the locational marginal price (LMP) across two different nodes in a transmission system. FTR is usually purchased by a firm transmission customer and is a financial equivalent of the physical power delivered across the two nodes. FTRs are auctioned in several mechanisms ranging from a long term period of three years to one month in addition to the secondary market where bilateral trading between members takes place. The auction price of the FTR is determined by the ISO using simultaneous feasibility test between source and sink node. The market settlement for an FTR includes a target allocation for the FTR holder which is dependent on the FTR MWs purchased and the difference between the day ahead LMP between source and sink. All the above mentioned points are discussed in more detail in the following sub-sections.
Understanding Financial Transmission Rights
Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) are also known as Fixed Transmission Rights (FTRs), Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCCs) or Congestion Revenue Rights (CRRs) [6] . A financial transmission right is a financial instrument which is used to compensate the difference in LMP prices across two different nodes in the network. In other words, FTR is used to prevent the holder from transmission congestion costs in order to deliver energy from one node to another. FTRs are defined from a point of receipt to point of delivery [6] . FTRs are independent of actual energy delivery and the FTR holders do not represent a right to deliver energy [6] . The holders of FTRs are not required to have a generation source or a load in the network as a result of which FTRs can be seen as a pure business opportunity [6] . The revenue generated by the FTRs to the holder is based on the FTR MWs bought and the difference between the LMP at the receipt (to) node and the delivery (from) node. Firm transmission customers often buy FTRs to prevent themselves from the risk of increased costs due to transmission congestion [7] . If a generator owner holds the FTR, the energy is sold at the point of delivery price by injecting energy at the point of receipt. Similarly if a load entity holds an FTR, the energy is bought at the generator node price while the load is located at the delivery node.
FTR Auction Mechanism
The FTR auction mechanism in PJM RTO is discussed in this section.
The other RTOs might have slight differences in the auction mechanism but the overall structure would be the same. Before the FTR auction is held, auction revenue rights (ARRs) are allocated to various NITS and firm PTP customers. ARRs are entitlements given to market participants to receive a portion of the revenue from Annual FTR auctions [7] . ARRs are requested by the market participants for RTO approval.
The RTO approves the requested ARRs for qualifying transmission customers based on the simultaneous feasibility test. The amount and the time period for which the ARRs are requested are usually consistent with the transmission service request [7] . The holders of the ARRs may retain the ARRs and receive the allocated revenue in the Annual FTR auction or convert ARRs to FTRs or reconfigure the ARRs to different paths [7] .
Once the ARRs are allocated to the network and firm customers, the FTRs are usually sold in the market in four mechanisms namely Long Term FTR Auction, Annual FTR auction, monthly FTR auction or FTR secondary market.
The ARRs are modeled as fixed injections and withdrawals and the remaining FTRs are available in the long term FTR auction [7] . Long term FTR auction is a multi round process where RTOs buy and sell FTRs. Similarly the RTOs offer the entire transmission entitlements available for sale on an annual basis in the Annual FTR auction. The RTOs conduct monthly FTR auctions to offer the remaining FTRs for sale available after long term and annual FTR auctions. In the secondary FTR auction, FTRs are traded between members bilaterally. The RTOs do not maintain billing and accounting for secondary FTR market. The FTRs purchased in the long term auction will have a period of one or three years and the FTRs purchased in annual auction will have a period of one year. The FTRs purchased in the monthly auction will have a period of one month for any of the next three consecutive months available in the quarter.
FTRs are awarded as options or obligations for annual and short term FTRs and only as obligations for long term FTRs. In addition, FTRs are also awarded as on peak FTR (08-23hrs on weekdays except NERC holidays) or off peak FTRs (24 to 7 hrs on weekdays and weekends and NERC holidays) or 24 hour FTR product valid for all days and all hours [7] . The value of FTR option is always greater than FTR obligation and the clearing prices of FTR option can never be negative.
Market Settlements
The transmission congestion credit target allocation is the credit given to the holder of the FTR for each hour due to the value of FTR. The target allocation is calculated as a product of FTR MW and the difference between day ahead LMP at the point of delivery and point of receipt.
- [7] Where TA = Target Allocation FTRMWs = FTR MWs purchased by the holder DALMP Del = day ahead LMP at point of delivery DALMP Rec = day ahead LMP at point of receipt
The revenues collected from the FTR auctions are distributed to the ARR holders in proportion to the economic value of the ARRs and the clearing prices of FTRs in the auction. The excess revenues available are used to fund the any shortfall in FTR target allocations over the planning period.
If the total transmission congestion charges in the network are more than the FTR target allocation, the excess congestion charges are redistributed at the end of each month. If the transmission congestion charges are less than the target allocations, the transmission congestion credit for each FTR is a share of the transmission congestion charges collected in proportion to the target allocation. The shortfalls occurred in each hour might be offset at the end of the month.
Simultaneous Feasibility Test
Simultaneous Feasibility Test (SFT) is a test or a study performed by the RTOs to set the FTR or ARR price before offering them in the auction. The SFT test is conducted [7]  To ensure that adequate revenue is being collected by the RTO for the set of offered FTRs or ARRs in the transmission system.  By using a DC power flow analysis and the model includes all the new and existing firm transmission reservations and NITS customer reservations.  With appropriate transmission network topology along with scheduled outages (based on reasonable assumptions) and thermal limits during the period of time under study.  On a yearly, monthly, and weekly basis to determine the winning quotes for FTRs and ARRs.
The SFT test is not a reliability test and does not include the actual system model conditions. The test is run for every FTR or ARR awarded and evaluates the ability of the system to withstand with the corresponding limits during normal and single contingency cases [7] .
FTR xplained xample E through E
Consider a three bus system with two generators and two loads as shown in the figure 1 below [12] .
Figure 1. Three bus system
The power flow capacity for generators, loads and the transmission lines along with bid price is shown in the figure 1.
The dispatch from generators to supply the loads for unconstrained case is shown in figure 2 
LMP calculation for three bus system
Let both G1 and G2 be conventional generators which will be able to follow the dispatch commands received from the RTOs. The amounts paid to the generators and collected from the loads by the RTO is given by the following table Where TCC = Transmission congestion charges collected by RTO. Assuming, the generators G1 and G2 has brought FTRs along lines L 12 for 400MW and L 23 for 100MW respectively in the annual FTR auction. As discussed before as the FTR are bought in annual auction, it would be valid for one year.
The target allocation (TA) for the FTR holders is given in table 3 below. Positive TA indicated payments to FTR holder and negative TA indicated a liability for the FTR holder to the RTO. It should be noted that the congestion charges collected by the RTOs is redistributed to the FTR holders. The revenue adequacy to pay the FTR holders is made sure by the RTOs using SFTs. Total revenue for G1 = $10000 + $6000 = $16000 Total revenue for G2 = $4000 -$750 = $3250 Hence, using the FTRs, the source sells the energy at the LMP of the sink thereby avoiding the risk of transmission congestion. In this example, it is assumed that the transmission line does not incur any losses. FTR do not hedge against the losses and FTR payments are independent of energy delivery.
Risk Involved in Purchasing FTRs for ind rojects W P
As discussed before, in most markets FTRs exist as obligations where the holder of the FTR might be credited or liable for the target allocation amount to the RTO. The holder of FTR would have risk of liability when the tonode LMP is less than the from-node LMP. However conventional generators owners are usually offset for the FTR liability by selling the energy at a higher price [1] . But in the case of wind farms, the generator might not produce energy when the price difference due to congestion exists. The concept of FTR might expose the wind farms to a negative cash flow which is a potential issue with the intermittent generations such as wind [1] .
Case tudy: Wind rojects with FTRs S P
The risk of negative cash flow for wind farm due to FTRs is illustrated with the case shown in figure 5 . Considering the three bus system discussed earlier with the generator G2 as a wind power plant delivering only 10% of nominal power, holds the FTRs for line L 23 for 100MW and load L1 is reduced to 10MW.
Figure 5. Three bus system with G2 as wind generator
The amount paid to the generators and collected from the loads for the power flow and day ahead LMP prices shown in figure 5 is given in the table 4 below. The target allocation for FTR holders remain the same as in the previous case as the FTR MWs is independent of the actual energy flow in the day ahead market. Total revenue for G1 = $10000 + $6000 = $16000 Total revenue for G2 = $400 -$750 = -$350
Hence, it is shown that FTRs might result in a negative cash flow for intermittent generation sources.
Recommendations to Overcome the Drawbacks of Existing FTRs
Some of the methods to overcome the drawbacks mentioned above are discussed in this section. The first method is to analyse the wind project factors in order to determine the optimal FTR MWs that should be purchased during various time periods of the project. The second method is to extend the concept of existing FTRs to wind FTRs which provides a solution to avoid negative cash flow. Both the above methods are discussed in more detail in the following sub-sections.
Factors Influencing FTR Investment for Wind rojects P
It is required to perform cost analysis on various parameters affecting the investment for reserving transmission. First, the feasibility of the investment and its impact on the cash flow of the wind farm during the initial phase of the project and through its lifetime has to be analyzed. The study of FTR investment with respect to wind farm characteristics cost of energy and correlation with generation interconnection costs has to be performed.
Wind Farm Characteristics
Given the initial investment required for transmission reservation, it is obvious to infer that there would be a minimum values for each of the variables listed below for which project becomes economically infeasible. It is recommended to analyze the impact of variation of each variable before and after including transmission reservation costs.
 Size of the wind farm  PPA Price  Capacity factor of the wind farm  Rate of return  With/ without tax benefits
Cost of Energy without Including Generation Interconnection Costs
Analysis of cost of energy would be a great indicator in order to compare the effect of transmission reservation costs for a wind plant with the conventional energy sources of same capacity. The analysis would clearly expose the excess risk involved for the wind power plants by purchasing FTRs independent of power plant characteristics.
Generation Interconnection and its Correlation with Transmission Reservation
Three studies are performed by the RTO for a wind power plant namely generation interconnection, transmission request and FTR. The upgrades required and the cost allocated to the wind project by each of the study comes by running different sets of models and for different purposes. Until now, a correlation between each of these cost allocations has not been found. Due to the increased complexity of the wind power plants, it is highly recommended to analyze the impact of each study on the other and the common area leading to same costs in all the three study methodologies mentioned below  Generation interconnection study  Point to point transmission request study  FTR costs between two nodes from simultaneous feasibility test
Wind FTRs
Financial transmission rights are independent of physical MW flow across the transmission line. The concept of making the FTRs and actual MW flow separate, works for conventional energy sources such as coal and gas power plants. Conventional energy sources are capable of scheduling their MW flow in advance for which FTR MWs would be purchased. But for intermittent sources such as wind, making FTRs independent to MW generation might lead to negative cash flow as shown in example case in section 3. The negative cash flow is putting the wind plants into further risk which defeats the whole purpose of reserving transmission through FTRs.
To overcome the drawback of existing FTRs, special FTRs called wind FTRs should be introduced. In the day ahead market, the wind power plants provide the resource offer based on the wind forecast. The additional risk for the intermittent resources is with respect to the difference in the FTR MWs and the actual MWs committed in the day ahead market. The part of FTRs equal to the actual MWs committed in the DAM are called as dispatchable FTRs and the remaining are termed as residual FTRs in this paper. 2. Assume that long term FTRs equal to the capacity of the wind plant is purchased by the owner. Using the wind forecast it was determined that the residual FTRs exist for the next day. If there is sufficient power flow across in between the two nodes for which residual FTRs exist either due to non-firm customers or due to contingency across other paths, then RTO should compensate the wind projects for residual FTRs with the revenue generated by the non-firm customers first.
3. Wind farm developers can estimate the amount of residual FTRs available on a monthly basis using advanced wind forecasting methodologies. The RTO should allow wind project owners to sell their residual FTRs in the monthly auction or in the secondary market. The difference between other FTRs and the residual FTRs sold in the monthly auction is that the MW FTRs sold in a residual case varies on a daily basis within a month as compared to a constant value although with other FTRs.
This would increase the accounting and billing complexity but would reduce the risk of negative cash flow for wind farm owners.
Assuming that wind farm developer purchases
FTRs for a percentage of wind farm capacity over a period of time. The percentage is calculated based upon factors such as net capacity factor, wind farm size, transmission congestion at POI. The excess power generated from the wind farm above the FTR MWs purchased is injected on a non-firm basis. The RTOs should allow the wind farm developers to bank the residual FTRs. In case excess transmission capacity is available for the required path sometime in the future, the RTOs should give preference to the holders of banked residual FTRs over non firm customers. This would leverage the FTR investment by wind power plants to the maximum extent possible.
Two obvious concerns for the ISOs to make such FTRs available are added billing complexity in settlements and possibility for an under revenue problem.
The current FTR system requires all the members to submit the actual MW flow as it should be used for energy settlements [13] . Dispatchable FTRs are nothing but the actual MWs of power flowing through the line. Hence substituting the actual MWs instead of the FTR MWs purchased would not add any billing complexity in settlements. The excess revenue in an FTR mechanism is generated by the difference in the energy bids offered in the day ahead market and the actual MWs flow in real time (as in the case of conventional generation) [13] .
PJM has been facing an issue of revenue inadequacy in the last three to four years. The main reason leading to revenue inadequacy was found to be due to discrepancies between the day ahead market model, operational system and FTR model [14] . Inaccurate modeling of the system leads to differences between the day ahead market congestions and actual congestions leading to negative balancing congestion. Differences between the actual operational condition and FTR models lead to overselling of FTR compared to actual capability of the system. Negative balancing congestion and overselling of FTRs are the most important reasons for FTR underfunding [14] .
Residual FTRs are those excess FTRs for which no actual MW flow will take place. Hence considering residual FTRs as if they don't exist or associating the residual FTRs to energy transfer by a non-firm customer will reduce the probability of under revenue and provides revenue adequacy to the ISOs. Further considering the residual FTRs separate for wind generation will reduce the inherent error currently present between the day ahead market MW bids and constant FTR MWs considered in the FTR model for wind power plants.
Conclusion
The existing FTRs are designed in such a way that the generators and the loads with constant or regularly varying MW, can hedge themselves from the price risk due to transmission congestion. Unfortunately such a design does not work for intermittent generation resources such as wind farms. The intermittent resources are exposed to increased risk and poorly hedged with the existing FTRs [8] . Hence the drawback of FTRs for the wind generation sources should be addressed by the wind and the utility industry. As obtaining transmission rights can be seen as a separate economic model, the correlation between the economic models for wind and transmission investment should be obtained. An analysis of the factors affecting the FTRs investment in a wind project should be studied in detailed by the wind industry. In addition, the RTOs should be requested to support the wind industry by extending the existing concept of FTRs to wind FTRs which reduces the risk of negative cash flow for wind projects.
